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A decision for a compliance option based on the price signal
The EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) is designed to help EU member states achieve their commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in a cost-effective way. It was not meant to work as a stand-alone tool but as part of the package of abatement measures across the board. It is a cap-and-trade system. Member states first impose caps on GHG emissions -initially only CO 2 until 2012 -from installations in specified sectors, mainly the power sector and industry subsectors (e.g. steel, cement, glass, paper and pulp). Emissions from these sectors amount to 40% of total EU emissions. Next, they allocate allowances to installations. Each installation surrenders a number of allowances equal to the total emissions from that installation during the preceding year.
To meet its obligations, an installation has essentially two options: to reduce emissions or to purchase EU allowances or credits from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or Joint Implementation (JI) -two of the flexible mechanisms available under the Kyoto Protocol. The decision of the participating company depends on the CO 2 price signals sent by the market. This system ensures that emissions reductions are achieved at the lowest cost. A sweetener for industry was free allocation of allowances until 2012.
There was a general understanding about the urgency in and scale of action needed despite uncertainty about the future of a global agreement, which prompted the EU to search for an innovative approach. The EU ETS gained a relatively broad support base among stakeholders as a favourite against regulations or energy/CO 2 taxes. Nonetheless it was politically difficult to introduce stringent caps prior to the start of the Kyoto Protocol commitment period .
New member states prioritised participation in the ETS
The ETS was introduced in 2005 in two steps, i.e. the first period (2005-07) and the second period The real political trouble came from a different corner after companies in energy-intensive industry suddenly discovered that they would end up paying twice: once for their process emissions, and once through higher power prices. While they thought they could live with the first bill, the extra invoice had not been budgeted for. In addition, they discovered that power generators could book handsome windfall profits. What really caused a stir was that this would be not only true for low-carbon producers such as nuclear and hydro but also for coal plants. Why? Power prices are set on the basis of marginal costs. Since the marginal producer is coal most of the time, power price increases are substantial as coal needs many allowances. As power generators will find it easy to pass on additional costs, while getting their allowances for free, they make extra profits.
To date, neither the windfall profits made by the power sector nor damage to the industry sectors covered have been a real problem. CO 2 prices have generally been too low to inflict any such negative impact on competitiveness. Similarly the extent to which industry has lost competitiveness has not been sufficiently established. Examination of these impacts is only in the initial stage.
Lastly, relations between the EU ETS and the Kyoto Protocol have become delicate. For the purpose of the treaty, the scheme is viewed as a domestic measure that is not part of the flexible mechanisms (CDM, JI, 'emissions trading'). Yet the ETS accepts use of CDM/JI credits for compliance, which implies an indirect linkage between the EU ETS and CDM/JI through trading units. Their flow is currently unilateral in that the main demand for CDM/JI credits has been driven by the EU ETS, as the only mandatory cap-and-trade scheme in existence. On the other hand, there might have been some trade-off between the ETS and JI. New member states were obliged to participate in the EU ETS from 2005 onwards, while keeping their country-based Kyoto Protocol targets. They could also host JI projects or even sell surplus allowances to other countries in need. However, partly due to uncertainty about these flexible mechanisms, but more likely due to commitments to the EU ETS and subsequent shortage of resources, most new member states gave priority to participation in the ETS. and steady predictable reductions of 1.74% annually even beyond 2020. The Commission's answer to windfall profits would be full auctioning for the power sector from 2013. The industry might see a gradual phase-out of free allocation, although only if it cannot prove that auctioning would hamper its competitiveness. An initial grace period of free allocation was favoured over border tax adjustments demanded from certain industry associations and legislators. There will be an assessment of the situation of the industry by 2011.
There will be two possibilities for using CDM/JI credits in the period 2013-20. Before a satisfactory global agreement is reached, the EU will keep an independent commitment to achieve at least 20% GHG emissions reductions from the 1990 level by the year 2020. The use of these credits will be restricted until the conclusion of the global agreement. Under the global agreement, which will also mean that the EU takes on a target of 30% reduction from the 1990 level by 2020, the limit on the use of CDM/JI credits will be automatically raised up to half of the additional abatement effort. With more flexibility in the use of these credits, the 30% cut may not be as demanding or costly as it looks.
The proposal for the energy and climate change package now enters the next stage as the European Commission seeks to get approval from the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. The key challenge would be to obtain approval at the European Council meeting scheduled for 13-14 March 2008.
A long-term and dynamic view
There are some lessons to be drawn from the EU's experience with the EU ETS. First, there would be some compromise between the pursuit of the goal, i.e. achieving abatement at the least cost, and pragmatic considerations, namely smoothing the transfer of wealth across sectors and the transition or soft-landing to the low-carbon society. Second, the scheme was built on the assumption of 'learning by doing' with the possibility for improvements during the first two periods and, following a review, beyond. Many problems have emerged that were not anticipated by stakeholders. Third, it is not only the launching of the ETS that requires significant commitment and resources from all stakeholders and member states, but also its operation. The most underestimated but expensive part of the process would be the monitoring, verification and reporting. This burden has fallen most heavily on small installations and new member states. Fourth, the EU ETS has contributed to the development of the CDM but it might have diverted some capital which could have been invested in JI projects. Fifth, the EU ETS has brought climate change instantaneously into board rooms.
What is the implication for Japanese stakeholders? The key would be the importance of taking a dynamic view over next two to three decades; of introducing clarity, transparency and some flexibility in the rules and processes; and of securing firm commitments to emissions reductions. The EU ETS has been fully integrated into the EU commitment to emissions reductions and firmly placed as a central pillar of its policies and measures, and yet it has exhibited the ability to accommodate changing circumstances. The EU-ETS could give some food for thought along these lines to Japanese stakeholders. It is up to them how to taste it. 
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